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SOME COMMENTS ON ARBITRATION LEGISLATION
AND THE UNIFORM ACT*
MAYNARD E. PIRSIG**

In the absence of statute, an agreement to arbitrate is governed by
common-law rules. These have been succinctly stated as follows:
Common-law arbitration rests upon a voluntary agreement of the
parties to submit their dispute to an outsider. The submission agreement
may be oral and may be revoked at any time before the rendering of the
award. The tribunal, permanent or temporary, may be composed of any
number of arbitrators. They must be free from bias and interest in the
subject matter and may not be related by affinity or consanguinity to
either party. The arbitrators need not be sworn. Only existing disputes
may be submitted to them. The parties must be given notice of hearings
and are entitled to be present when all the evidence is received. The arbitrators have no power to subpoena witnesses or records and need not
conform to legal rules of hearing procedure other than to give the parties
an opportunity to present all competent evidence. All the arbitrators
must attend the hearings, consider the evidence jointly and arrive at an
award by a unanimous vote. The award may be oral, but if written all
the arbitrators must sign it. It must dispose of every substantial issue submitted to arbitration. An award may be set aside only for fraud, misconduct, gross mistake or substantial breach of a common-law rule. The only
method of enforcing the common-law award is to file suit upon it and
the judgment thus obtained may be enforced as any other judgment.'
These principles were liberal in limiting the procedural requirements of the arbitration process to the minimum required for a fair
hearing and in the limited grounds recognized for avoiding an award.
But in most other respects they failed to serve the needs of an effective
arbitration program. Two particularly serious defects were the revocability of an agreement to arbitrate and the necessity of resort to
a civil action to enforce the award. The first nullified the purpose of
the parties in entering into the agreement and the second did so in
substantial part by forcing the successful party into expensive and
time-consuming litigation.
*The Uniform Arbitration Act is the product of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and was approved in its present
form by that organization in 1956. While the act reflects the results of
discussions within the conference as a whole, the principal research and
drafting was necessarily done by a committee of the Conference. The
present members of the committee are Hon. Otis S. Allen, Topeka, Kan.;
Mr. Marvin J. Bertoch, Salt Lake City, Utah; Mr. Tom Martin Davis, Houston,
Tex.; Mr. Martin J. Dinkelspiel, San Francisco, Cal.; and the author, chairman. The chairman of the section of which the committee is a part is Mr.
Alfred M. Pence, Laramie, Wyo., who, previous to his chairmanship, was a
member of the committee. While the author has had the benefit of the views
of the committee which is in agreement on the provisions of the act, the
views here expressed are the author's own and carry no other weight.
**Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
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The task of arbitration statutes is to remedy these and other defects
of the common law principles. Such statutes have existed in this
country from earliest times. Among the first were those patterned on
the English act of 1698.2 Thus the New York act of 17913 began with
the following introduction:
Whereas it hath been found by experience, that references made by
rule of court, have contributed much to the ease of parties in determining
their differences, because the parties thereby become obligated to submit
to the award of the arbitrators, under the penalty of imprisonment for
their contempt, in case they refuse submission; Now for promoting trade
and rendering the awards of arbitrators the more effectual in all cases,
for the final determination of controversies referred to them by merchants
and traders, or others, concerning matters of account, or trade, or other

matters....
It then provided that the parties might agree that their submission
of their dispute to arbitrators be made a rule of court. On proof of the
agreement, a rule of court was to issue
that the parties shall submit to, and finally be concluded by the arbitration . . . and in case of disobedience to such arbitration or umpirage, the
party refusing or neglecting to perform and execute the same, or any
part thereof, shall be subject to all the penalties of contemning a rule of
court, when he is a suitor or defendant in such court . . . unless it shall
be made appear on oath to such court, that the arbitrators or umpire
misbehaved themselves, and that such award, arbitration, or umpirage,
was procured by corruption or other undue means. 4

A similar act was passed in Virginia in 17895 but with important
modifications. The contempt provisions were omitted and instead the
award could be entered as the judgment or decree of the court. The
award could be avoided if it "was procured by corruption or other
undue means, or that there was evident partiality or misbehavior in
the arbitrators or umpires, or any of them."

New Jersey adopted a similar act in 1794, but retained the contempt
provision. It added a curious provision that "whenever a cause shall
be referred, by rule of court, to referees, the report or award of such
referees, or of a major part of them, if confirmed by the court, shall be
final, and conclude the parties" and that judgment should be entered
thereon. 6 It suggests the close analogy thought to exist between arbitrations under rule of court and the use of referees appointed by a
court in litigation.
The same analogy was carried out further in the Massachusetts act
2.
3.
4.
5.

9 & 10 WILL. 3, c. 31 (1698).
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1791, c. 20.
The language is almost identical with that of the English act of 1698.
Va. Laws 1789, c. 46. This act appears to be the basis of the present
Virginia arbitration statute. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-503 (1950).
6. N.J. Laws 1794, Pat. 141.
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of 1786.7 But in form and content, it ignored the English act. Under
this act parties could agree "to have the dispute determined by referees, mutually chosen by the parties," and submit a statement
thereof to a justice of the peace who was then obligated to prepare an
agreement in the form set out in the statute to be subscribed and acknowledged by the parties. The agreement provided that the persons chosen as referees were to report to the court, "judgment
thereon to be final." The act provided further that "the Court of
Common Pleas, to whom the report of the referees may be made as
aforesaid, shall have cognizance thereof, in the same way and manner,
and the same doings shall be had thereon, as though the same had
been made by referees appointed by a rule of the same court." Referees so appointed were "vested with all the authority and power that
referees have been, or may hereafter be vested with, who have been,
or shall be appointed by a rule of court." Provision was also made for
summoning of witnesses.
This limited and incomplete review of early arbitration statutes is
sufficient to indicate the underlying purposes and methods of procedure which characterized such legislation. They represented an
effort to provide a simple procedure by which the award of an arbitrator could be enforced without resort to a regular action in court. This
took the form of either invoking the contempt powers of the court,
following the English 1698 act in this respect, or, what appears to have
been an innovation, permitting the award to be reduced to judgment
and enforced as such. But to invoke these powers of the court, it was
felt that something more than a simple agreement of the parties to
arbitrate was required. The agreement must be expressed with some
formalism, and the analogy of referees appointed by the court was
drawn upon. Any other position would have been at variance with
the formalism which characterized all judicial proceedings of the
times.
The statutes had limited objectives. They were confined to agreements to arbitrate existing disputes as distinguished from disputes
arising after the agreement was made. They did not abrogate common
law principles applicable to those agreements not coming within the
terms of the statutes.
It was against this background that a new, and, for the times, a radi.cally different arbitration statute appeared in the New York revision
of 1829.8 This statute undertook to present a rather comprehensive
.code on the subject. The success of the venture is indicated by the
fact that it has served as a model for legislation in many other states
which still survives to this day.
7. Mass. Laws 1786, c. 21.
8. N.Y. REv. STAT. 1829, pt. 3, c. 8, tit. 14.
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The objectives of the revisors are indicated by their note to section 1:
Instead of enforcing an award by process of contempt, in cases where
such process is not applicable, (Section 18 limited contempt proceedings to
judgments on awards requiring an act other than the payment of money.)
it is proposed to authorize a regular judgment to be entered, filed and
docketed, and an execution to be issued against the property or person,
conformably to the laws of Massachusetts, 1 v. p. 266; of Virginia, v. 1,
p. 454; of Missouri, v. 1, 137. By this means, the parties will be saved the
necessity of an expensive and perplexing action, on the bond or the award;
and the object of the statute 'to contribute much to the ease of parties, in
the determining their differences,' as expressed in its preamble, will be
more effectually obtained. The remedies for relief will be found to be
as ample as by the existing law, or as are afforded by an action.
The act provided that the parties "may, by an instrument in writing,
submit to the decision of one or more arbitrators, any controversy
existing between them, which might be the subject of an action at
law, or of a suit in equity.., and, may, in such submission, agree that
a judgment of any court of law and of record, to be designated in such
instrument, shall be rendered upon the award made pursuant to such
submission."9
It excluded certain actions relating to real estate, incorporating the
common law in this respect.10 It provided for the hearing and its
postponement" in language which has survived in many present day
statutes, prescribed an oath for the arbitrators, 12 provided for subpoenas, 13 and required the award to be in writing subscribed by the
arbitrators and attested by a subscribing witness. 4 On proof of the
submission "by the affidavit of a subscribing witness" and similarly
of the award, within one year, the court by rule in open court was to
confirm the award. 15
The act then provided in terms common in present-day statutes, including those of New York, for the vacation of an award 16 or for its
modification. 17 On confirmation, the award was to be reduced to
judgment to be filed and docketed.' 8 The grounds for vacation were
those which the revisors thought represented the common law on the
subject. The grounds for modification were intended to remedy the
defect of the common law which did not give such power to the court.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. § 1.
Id. § 2. And see revisors' note to the section.
Id. §§ 3, 7.
Id. § 4.
Id. § 6.

14. Id. § 8.
15. Id. § 9.
16. Id. § 10.

17. Id. § 11.
18. Id. § 14.
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Applications to vacate or modify an award were to be by motion.19
20
On such motions the court could direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
But the revisors were unwilling to break very far with common law
principles. The Act was not to "be construed to impair, diminish, or
in any way affect the power and authority of the court of chancery
over arbitrators, awards, or the parties thereto; nor to impair or affect
any action upon any award, or upon any bond or other engagement
to abide by an award." 21 Also common law revocability of any submission to arbitration was recognized but with liability for "all the
costs, expenses, and damages which (the opposing party) may have
on
incurred in preparing for such arbitration."22 Likewise, recovery
23
any bond given to insure against revocation was permitted.
The act was thus an interesting mixture of earlier statutes of New
York and other states, of common law principles and of some wholly
new and progressive provisions.
The act remained practically unchanged until 1880 when there was
considerable clarification of procedure, some additions such as the
effect of death of a party, some changes deemed needed to conform the
act to the existing judicial procedure and some modifications of substance such as the requirement that submissions and awards be
acknowledged "in like manner as a deed to be recorded. '24 But in
general, the basic structure of the 1829 act remained unchanged.
It was incorporated in substantially this form in the Civil Practice Act
of 1920, and is still the basis of the present New York act on the subject.
Aside from some of its overly technical features, the basic defect of
the 1829 act and its successors was their failure to encompass agreements to arbitrate disputes arising subsequent to the agreement. Such
an act failed to meet the needs of twentieth century trade and industry.
In 1920 New York adopted a short act of major significance specifically
directed at validating agreements to arbitrate future disputes and
providing a simple and summary procedure for their enforcement.2
Section 2 provided:
A provision in a written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising between the parties to the contract, or a submission
hereafter entered into of an existing controversy to arbitration pursuant
to title eight of chapter seventeen of the code of civil procedure (This refers to the chapter based on the 1829 act discussed above) shall be valid,
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. § 12.
Id. § 13.
Id. § 22.
Id. § 23.
Id. § 24.
N.Y. CODE Cw. PROC. 1880, § 2365.
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1920, c. 275.
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It provided also a motion procedure for compelling a party to proceed with the arbitration. The issues whether there was an agreement
to arbitrate and whether there had been failure to comply therewith
were to be tried by a jury. Any action involving an issue subject to
arbitration was to be stayed. Appointment of arbitratorsby the court,
when the agreed method failed, was also provided for.
The provisions of the existing arbitration statutes were incorporated
by reference "so far as practicable and consistent with this chapter." To
eliminate the former requirement that the parties agree that a specified court could render judgment, it was provided that the supreme
court should have jurisdiction.
The provisions of the old act recognizing the revocability of an
agreement to arbitrate were expressly repealed.
Curiously, at the same session of the New York legislature, the old
act was substantially re-enacted as part of the Civil Practice Act
without incorporating the new law.26 The two acts were not integrated
into a single unit until some years later, the history of which will not
be traced here. The result was that the law of New York on the subject, while representing a major step forward, was not in a form
suitable for adoption by other states. It still represents to this day a
hodgepodge of patchwork legislation, confusing and difficult to understand. To fill the need, the American Arbitration Association prepared
a model act patterned on the New York law. 27 A number of leading
states soon began to enact such legislation. A federal act was enacted
in 1925.28 At the present time, some fifteen states have enacted similar
laws although none of them are identical in terminology or even in
29
substance.
A few states have recognized the validity of agreements to arbitrate
future disputes by judicial decision.30 In the remaining states, such
agreements cannot be enforced. Most of these states have statutes for
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate existing disputes. They
are of infinite variety, most of them reflecting in greater or less meas26. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1920, c. 925, art. 83.
27. See

AMERICAN ARBITRATION Ass'N, THE PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBI-

227. For a more recent draft of a model act by a committee
of the Association, see 7 ARB. J. (n.s.) 202 (1952). This draft was of substantial help to the committee which drafted the uniform act.
28. 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-14 (1953, Supp. 1956).
29. ARiz. CODE ANN. §§ 27-301 to 27-311 (1939); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. 28
1280-93 (Deering 1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8151-67 (1949); LA. REV.
STAT. §§ 9:4201-17 (1950); MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 251, §§ 1-22 (1932); MICH.
CoMP. LAws §§ 645.1-.24 (1948); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-:10
(1955); N. J. REV. STAT. § 2A:40-1 to 40-2 (1951); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
2711.01-.15 (Baldwin 1953); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 33.210-.340 (1953); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, §§ 161-200 (1930); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. C. 475, 8§ 1-17 (1938);
WAsH. REV. CODE § 7.04.040-.220 (1951); Wis. STAT. §§ 298.01-.18 (1955).
30. E.g., Park Construction Co. v. Independent School Dist., 209 Minn. 182,
296 N.W. 457 (1941).
TRATION
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ure the New York law of 1829. Some31of them appear to be descendants
of legislation predating the 1829 act.
When one considers the extensive growth of the use of arbitration
in both the commercial and labor-management fields, with the activities affected extending in many instances beyond state lines, the need
for a uniform act incorporating modern experience and thinking on
the subject seems evident. The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws undertook the preparation of such an act in
1924 but became embroiled in a controversy over its applicability to
future disputes clauses. The act which emerged was limited to agreements to arbitrate existing disputes. It was adopted in but few states
and was later withdrawn by the Conference.
The present uniform act represents a simplification and modernization of the New York arbitration law and its prototypes in other states.
All in all it is a very simple act. Its essential purpose is to make an
agreement to arbitrate effective whether relating to existing or future
disputes. For this purpose it enlists the aid of the court by a simple
non-technical and summary procedure which safeguards the parties
against claims for arbitration not warranted by their agreement and
which effectively enforces the agreement to arbitrate as made and the
award made in conformity with the agreement. Its main features will
be summarized.
Validating ArbitrationAgreements
The act provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. This act also applies to arbitration agreements
between employers and employees or between their respective representatives (unless otherwise provided in the agreement).32
All that is required is that the agreement be in writing. It need not
be subscribed, or attested by a witness, or acknowledged. No formality
of any kind, other than that the agreement be in writing, is needed
in order to secure the assistance of the court in enforcing the agreement or the award made under it. The issues agreed to be arbitrated
may relate to real estate or any other subject so long as considerations
of public policy are not adversely affected as in divorce and criminal
cases. The act does not apply to appraisals since these have been held
not to be arbitrations.3 The act does not extend to oral arbitration
31. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 5701.06 (1953).
32. UNiFoRM ARBITRATION ACT § 1.
33. In re Fletcher, 237 N.Y. 440, 143 N.E. 248 (1924). The New York act
was amended in 1941 to include appraisals. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT § 1448. See
Fitzgerald v. Continental Ins. Co., 275 App. Div. 453, 90 N.Y.S.2d 430 (3d
Dept. 1949).
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agreements as to which the common law principles will continue to
apply. It was considered unwise to permit an irrevocable arbitration
agreement to be left to the uncertainties of a claimed oral transaction.
The controversy agreed to be arbitrated need not arise out of the
contract containing the arbitration clause and it need not be one of
which a court would take cognizance.34
The act applies to arbitration clauses in labor contracts unless the
contract provides otherwise. Existing statutes validating future disputes clauses sometimes include such contracts. Some do not. The
rash of cases in which arbitration is sought under section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act would appear to indicate that enabling legislation
in the states which do not now validate such clauses would meet a
strong need. There was evidence of concern, however, by labor interests over the possible unforeseen effects of the adoption of the uniform
act. The act as drawn satisfied this concern as far as could be ascertained.5 An alternative considered was to require that the labor contract affirmatively provide that the act should apply. In the absence of
such a provision, the common law would then apply. This was rejected
as unworkable. With the uniform act in existence, there would be
the very real prospect that the parties would assume its application
to their contract and neglect to incorporate the required contract
provision. At a later crucial time they would find nothing but an
unenforceable arbitration clause to look to.
Compelling Arbitration
The uniform act permits a party to proceed by way of a motion to
obtain a court order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration. 30
If he is one who is resisting a demand for arbitration, he may by motion ask for an order staying the arbitration.3 7 If an action has been
brought on an issue which the defendant considers comes within an
agreement to arbitrate, he may apply for an order in the action itself
staying the action and directing arbitration.38 In each of these procedures the question under the act is: Was there an agreement to
arbitrate?
By these provisions some important problems of the relation of
the courts to the arbitration process are raised about which a few
words should be said as to the intentions of the committee who were
34. See UNIFORm ARBITRATION ACT § 12, stating, '"But the fact that the
relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law
or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award."
See also O'Neal, Resolving Disputes in Closely Held Corporations: IntraInstitutionalArbitration,67 HARV. L. REv. 786 (1954).
35. See Isaacson, A PartialDefense of the Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 LAB.
L.J. 329 (1956). This article was written before the 1956 amendments removing the provisions criticized by the author.
36. UN FoRM ARBITRATION ACT § 2 (a).
37. Id. § 2(b).
38. Id. § 2 (d).
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given the task of preparing the act. The central questions which will
be raised by these procedures are: What issues, controversies or disputes have the parties by their contract agreed to arbitrate and who is
to decide this question?
What is being sought is the enforcement of a contract. If arbitration is demanded of a dispute which does not fall within the terms of
the agreement to arbitrate, the opposing party should not be compelled
to submit to it. That is the core of voluntary arbitration. In many instances it is desirable to incorporate in the agreement a provision that
what issues are to be arbitrated shall be determined by the arbitrator.
The uniform act permits this in the broad coverage of section 1. 39 But
if they have not done so, it seemed to the committee that in the present
state of the practices and assumptions of parties in making these agreements, the usual principle should apply that the court must ascertain
the existence of the agreement to arbitrate which it is asked to enforce. A party should not be required by a court to submit a claim to
so.
arbitration when he has not agreed to do
If the parties always made their intentions clear, there would be
40
little difficulty in carrying out these principles. But they do not,
either because they have not thought through all the specific applications of their agreement or because the delicate negotiations leading
to the contract do not permit them to be fully canvassed. The problems of construction that ensue may be considered under three general categories. It is recognized that these are not exhaustive in their
coverage and that their differences are in some measure ones of degree. Cases may be envisaged which do not fall within these categories
and "which still call for construction of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. But the classification is believed to be sufficient to illustrate
the principles incorporated into the uniform act and applicable to any
case which might arise under it.
First,the arbitration clause may be clear and precise and it is plain
that the dispute sought to be arbitrated does not fall within it. The
clause in a sales contract may be limited to disputes over quality and
the claim sought to be arbitrated is for non-delivery of an installment.
Or the clause is only as to wage adjustments and arbitration is demanded for wrongful discharge of an employee. Unless his contract
is to be completely ignored, the opposing party should not be compelled
in such cases to submit his contentions to arbitration. There is no such
agreement to arbitrate.
Second, in defining the scope of the issues intended to be submitted
to arbitration, the terms employed are substantially the same as those
used in other parts of the contract spelling out the respective rights
39. See note 32 and related text supra.
40. See Lowden, Labor Arbitration Clauses: Draftsmanship Avoids Litiga-

tion, 43 VA. L. REV. 197 (1957).
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of the parties. To illustrate, a collective bargaining agreement specifies
the wages to be paid and provides that any differentials "inwages"
between different classes of workers shall not be made without first
securing the approval of the union. The agreement is silent on bonuses.
It provides that any dispute as to the meaning or application of the
contract with respect to wages shall be settled by arbitration. The
company contends that a bonus is not wages. The union insists the
term was intended to include bonuses and demands arbitration. Quite
logically, it can be said that it is for the court to determine the meaning and scope of the word "wages" used in defining the scope of arbitration. Such construction, however, is destructive of the clause itself. It leaves to the court, on this preliminary application for
arbitration, the decision as to the meaning of the contract term "wages"
which by express stipulation of the parties was left to arbitration.
This is but a simple illustration of the infinite variety of situations
which contract provisions may create when the construction of the
arbitration clause by a court would also settle the meaning of other
provisions of the contract intended by the parties to be left to arbitration. It is the purpose of the uniform act to leave these questions to
arbitration. This is what was intended by the parties when they made
their contract. The primary difficulty of the committee was to express
this purpose in appropriate legislative terms. There was nothing to
serve as a guide in existing legislation. A simple formula was decided
upon. The sole issue under the act on these preliminary hearings to
compel or stay arbitration is: "Is there an agreement to arbitrate?" 41
In the above illustration there obviously was, and hence the court
would order arbitration.
Third, the contract, after stating the terms of the agreement between the parties, concludes with a general arbitration clause that
disputes over the meaning, interpretation and application of the contract shall be submitted to arbitration. It provides for wages, hours
of employment, discharges, etc. It is silent as to the right of the
employer to sublet any portion of his production or his right to close
his factory and open a new one in another part of the country. The
union insists that it was implicit in the contract that production was to
continue during the life of the contract substantially along the lines
existing when the contract was made. The employer contends that
in subletting or moving his operations he is merely exercising the
prerogatives retained by management. The union demands arbitra41. In § 2(a) the issue for determination on a motion to compel arbitration

is raised "if the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to
arbitrate . . ." Under § 2(b) "the court may stay an arbitration proceeding
commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to
arbitrate." While not so explicitly stated, the intention is plain that the
same principles govern under § 2(c) (d) when an application is made in a
pending action for an order staying the action and directing arbitration of an
issue involved in the action and "referable to arbitration."

1957 ]

COMMENTS ON THE UNIFORM ACT

tion. Here again the argument may be maintained that the right to
arbitrate is limited to matters arising out of the contract. What is
not in the contract is not subject to arbitration. The court must,
therefore, determine the limits of the contract to ascertain what it
is that may be arbitrated.
Again, the argument ends in destroying the agreement of the
parties that the meaning of the contract shall be determined by the
arbitrator. If the terms and meaning of the contract are determined
by the court in the process of defining the scope of permissible arbitration, there is nothing left for the arbitrator to consider except
the possible limited factual question whether the particular case
comes within the contract as construed by the court. In the illustration given, if the court should decide that the contract did not restrict
the right of the employer to sublet his production or move his
factory, there plainly would be nothing for the arbitrator to consider
on the dispute which has arisen. The terms and interpretation of the
contract have been decided by the court. This is the sole issue in
dispute. Should the court decide that the contract did restrict the
right of the employer in the respects indicated, it would be difficult
for the arbitrator to exercise any choice but to adhere to the decision.
Either decision constitutes an interpretation of the terms and meaning of the contract which the parties stipulated should be left to the
arbitrator. The intent of the Uniform Act is to leave these questions to
the decision of the arbitrator.
It should be observed that in all of these categories the court is
dealing with the question whether the dispute shall be submitted to
arbitration. Whether the position of the party seeking arbitration
with respect to the merits of the claim sought to be arbitrated is a
reasonable or permissible one is not the question presented. Nor
is it whether the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract in the
second and third categories may be so unreasonable as to go beyond
the limits of his authority conferred by the agreement. That cannot
be known until the award has been rendered. Here the only question
is shall arbitration be directed. An order to that effect will not
preclude a later objection to the award that it is so far removed from
any reasonable interpretation of the agreement that the arbitrator
went beyond his powers.
The incorporation of these principles into the uniform act necessitated consideration of another problem posed by some New York
decisions, beginning with InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. CutlerHammer,Inc.42 In this case an agreement between employer and union
provided that they were to meet in a given month "to discuss payment
of a bonus for the first six months of 1946." Disputes as to the
42. 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317

N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).

(1st Dept.), aff'd per curiam, 297
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"meaning, performance, non-performance or application" of its terms
were to be submitted to arbitration. The employer's position was
that he was only required "to discuss" whether a bonus should be
paid. The union insisted that the contract meant that a bonus must
be paid and that the only subject open for discussion was the amount
to be paid. The union's construction of the contract certainly involved the "meaning" of the terms of the contract and, therefore, came
within the scope of the arbitration clause. In the usual* case many
additional facts would appear, such as discussions which led to adoption of the language in the contract. Those discussions might show
that the union's construction was an impossible one or that reasonable
minds would conclude that it was an impossible one, or they might
show the reverse. But the arbitration clause in the case required that
these facts be presented to the arbitrator. Until he has made his
award, it cannot be known whether he will adopt an impossible construction. Consideration of that question must, therefore, be deferred
until the award has been rendered. Thus, the order requiring arbitration should have been granted without prejudice to that question.
But the court held otherwise and introduced a new judicial requirement before arbitration would be ordered:
All the bonus provision meant was that the parties would discuss the
payment of a bonus. It did not mean that they had to agree on a bonus or
that failing to agree an arbitrator would agree for them. Nor did it mean
that a bdnus must be paid and only the amount was open for discussion.
So clear is this and so untenable any other interpretation that we are
obliged to hold that there is no dispute as to meaning of the bonus provision and no contract to arbitrate the issue tendered.43

The next major case was General Electric Co. v. United Elec. Workers, CIO.44 The agreement provided for arbitration of disputes over
the application and interpretation of any of its provisions. It prohibited

discrimination because of union activity. Another agreement between
the parties provided for pay for up to eight hours per week for union

activity, the union to pay for any additional hours. Thereafter, the
company established a pension plan based on time paid for by the
company. There was no collective agreement on pensions. In de-

terming the amount of pensions payable under its plan, the company
refused to include hours spent in union activity in excess of the eight
hours per week. The union charged discrimination and demanded
arbitration. Again arbitration was denied, the court stating:
If, under the unambiguous terms of an agreement calling for arbitration,
there has been no default, the court may not make an order compelling
a party to proceed to arbitration. [citing the Cutler-Hammer case]. ...
43. 67 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
44. 300 N.Y. 262, 90 N.E.2d 181 (1949).
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Whether or not a bona fide dispute exists is a question of law [Wenger &
Co. v. Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, 239 N.Y. 199, 202-03].... If there is no
real ground of claim, the court may refuse to allow arbitration, although
the alleged dispute may fall within the literal language of the arbitration
agreement. Such is the situation here.45
The same criticisms are applicable to this case which were made of
the Cutler-Hammer decision.
In Alpert v. Admiration Knitwear Co.46 the parties to a sales contract agreed that "any complaint, controversy or question which may
arise with respect to this contract that cannot be settled by the parties
thereto* shall be referred to arbitration in the following manner .... ."47
The contract contained the provision that: ". . . if at any time, in
the sole opinion of the Seller, the financial responsibility of the Purchaser shall become impaired or unsatisfactory to the Seller cash
payments in advance of delivery may be required." 48 (Emphasis
added by the court.)
The seller notified the buyer that "your financial responsibility is
unsatisfactory under all the circumstances of this sale" and required
that payment be made in advance of shipment. Arbitration again
was denied, with this statement:
Concluding, as we do, that the seller's demand and notice to the purchaser, contained in its letter of June 8, 1950, was in accord with its right
expressly provided by the contract, we think the case falls within the
rule stated in Matter of General Electric Co. v. United Elec. Radio &
Mach. Workers... .49
The court then quotes the language reproduced above from the
GeneralElectric Co. case. With such a clear and unqualified statement
in the contract of the right of the seller to withhold credit the buyer
might have difficulty establishing any reasonable basis for avoiding
its effect and an arbitrator's award relieving him of its application
might be found to be capricious and arbitrary and an attempt to
change the contract of the parties. Under the principles later to be
discussed, such an award would be beyond the power of the arbitrator
to make. But, under the principles discussed earlier, the buyer had
the right to try to make such a showing since the agreement was that
"'anycomplaint, controversy or question which may arise with respect
to this contract . . . shall be referred to arbitration." He might be
able to show, for example, that the rigorous credit provision was
agreed to by the parties only in the expectation that he could appeal
to the sense of fairness and equity of the arbitrator which, under
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

90 N.E.2d at 182.
304 N.Y. 1, 105 N.E.2d 561 (1952).
105 N.E.2d at 563.
105 N.E.2d at 562.
105 N.E.2d at 563.
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recognized principles governing arbitration, the arbitrator could apply
and that the credit provision was understood in this qualified sense.
The opportunity to make such a showing was denied him by the
decision.
In effect, this doctrine requires that a party seeking enforcement of
an agreement to arbitrate must not only show that an agreement
to arbitrate the dispute in question was made but must also satisfy the
court that the claim made by him has some merit. The court thus
interposes its judgment on the issue before it will permit the parties
to submit the issue to the arbitrator. This places a serious restriction
upon the contract of the parties not stipulated by them. They had
agreed that the merits of the issue in dispute should be determined
by the arbitrator, not the court. The doctrine has received widespread
condemnation.5 0
The more recent case of Bohlinger v. National Cash Register Co.51
raises considerable doubt as to the extent to which the doctrine will
be adhered to in New York. In this case the contract provided for
reference to an arbitrator of "any dispute between the parties hereto
with reference to any matter not provided for in this Contract, or in
reference to the terms, interpretations or application of this Contract. '52 The union claimed that a discharge, allegedly for having
worked for a competitor during off hours, was in fact for charges of
disloyalty and without notice. The lower court denied arbitration because the agreement placed no restriction on the employer's right of
discharge and hence was not subject to arbitration. This was reversed
on the ground that the dispute was covered by the agreement to
arbitrate "any matter not provided for in this Contract." The significance of the decision is that no reference was made to the CutlerHammer doctrine notwithstanding the dissenting opinion which insisted the employer had "an absolute, common-law right to discharge
its employees, with or without cause" and this right not having been
contracted away there was nothing to arbitrate.
The lower New York courts since the Bohlinger case are divided in
their observance of the Cutler-Hammer doctrine. 53 That other states
in which the question is an open one will repudiate the doctrine is
indicated by the recent Washington decision of Greyhound Corp. v.
Division 1384, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry., and Motor Coach
Employees54 in which the court stated:
50. See FREiDiN, LABOR ARBITRATION AND THE COURTS 7 (1952); Comment, 21
U. Cm. L. REV. 148 (1953).
51. 305 N.Y. 539, 114 N.E.2d 31 (1953).
52. 114 N.E.2d at 31.
53. See Kharas & Koretz, Judicial Determination of the Arbitrable Issue,
11 ARB. J. (n.s.) 135 (1956).
54. 44 Wash. 2d 808, 271 P.2d 689, 696 (1954).
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When union and employer, in very clear language, have by agreement
chosen an arbitration board as the ultimate forum for the resolution of
disputes, there is a very real question as to whether the courts should impose upon the parties the burden of showing in court or in a judicial forum
that a dispute is bona fide as a condition to the right of either party to
submit the matter to arbitration. In deciding whether a dispute is bona
fide, as was done in the Cutler-Hammer case, supra, there is the danger
that a court, because of a very liberal or a mistaken impression of its
function, may, for practical purposes, become the forum for the determination of the dispute. Anything less than a cautious application of the rule
would permit a party to an arbitration agreement to choose between a
judicial forum and an arbitration forum for the settlement of a controversy, notwithstanding his solemn agreement in writing to submit all
disputes to arbitration.55
It was the opinion of the committee that all doubt on this question
should be removed by the uniform act and the doctrine of the New
York cases nullified. Accordingly the act provides:
An order for arbitration shall not be refused on the ground that the
claim in issue lacks merit or bona fides or because any fault or grounds
for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not been shown. 56
This provision covers any issue, whether one of fact or one of construction of the terms of the contract. It applies to the issues sought
to be arbitrated in the three categories discussed above.
Appointment of Arbitrators
Under the uniform act the method of appointment of arbitrators
specified in the agreement of the parties controls. But if the agreement is silent on the subject or the method agreed upon cannot be
carried out, the arbitration does not fail, but the court may appoint the
necessary arbitrators.5 7 The suggestion was considered that the
court be restricted in its appointments to lists provided by some
agency such as the American Arbitration Association or the United
States Mediation and Conciliation Service or some corresponding
55. Referring to the Cutler-Hammer decision, the court observed "The force
of that decision has been weakened by the case of Matter of Bohlinger ..
271 P.2d at 696.
Some relaxation of New Jersey's adherence to the Cutler-Hammer doctrine
is indicated in Standard Oil Development Co. Employees Union v. Esso Research & Engineering Co., 38 N.J. Super. 106, 118 A.2d 70, 75 (1955), the
court stating: "It is not our intention to express the view that before the
parties will be ordered to the forum of arbitration, the judicial mind must find
merit in an asserted interpretation. The test being expounded is that arbitration will be directed when it appears to the mind of the ordinary layman
that the particular language involved is reasonably open to the connotation
contended for. If the contention proposed is such that no ordinary layman,
acting in good faith, would seriously advance it, then our statutory power
will not be exercised." These remarks were directed to a motion to compel
arbitration. But cf. Botany Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 126 A.2d 389 (1956).
56. UNIFORm ARBITRATION ACT § 2 (e).
57. Id. § 3.
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state agency. This was felt to be unnecessary and undesirable. When
application is made for the appointment of arbitrators in those cases
where the agreement makes no provision for their appointment, the
parties can and would be expected by the court to suggest appropriate
names. Lists supplied by these agencies could be made available.
But the parties ought not to be confined to or required to submit such
lists, considering particularly the political fortunes of some of these
agencies. Should the parties desire to be so confined, they can so
provide in their contract.
Hearing
There are not many provisions in the act controlling the arbitration hearing. They are contained principally in section five, all of
which is made subject to such stipulations as the parties may have
made in their contract. The intent is primarily to provide for those
safeguards and contingencies which the parties may not have thought
about.
Unless waived by appearance at the hearing, notice of the arbitration
hearing must be given by personal service or by registered mail.
An award may be rendered against a party so notified even though
he does not appear. The hearing may be adjourned from time to
time, but not, without consent, beyond the time fixed by the agreement for the award. The importance of a fair hearing is emphasized
in that "the parties are entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to the controversy and to cross-examine witnesses appearing
at the hearing."58 Since there is no provision to the contrary, a
stenographic record of the testimony need not be made nor is any
other record of the evidence received required. The act contemplates
the informality of procedure and freedom from technical rules of
evidence which the common law has always permitted.
A party has a right to be represented by counsel which cannot be
waived prior to the hearing.59 The purpose is to enable a party to
determine the need for counsel after and in the light of the con0
troversy when it has arisen and is to be submitted to arbitration.6
upon
He is, however, expected to make up his mind when he enters
the hearing; and, if he then fails to have counsel and proceeds without
one, he cannot thereafter disrupt the proceedings by refusing to participate further and insisting on employment of counsel.
58. Id. § 5 (b).
59. Id. § 6.
60. Compare N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT. § 1454(1): "No waiver of the right to be
represented by an attorney in any proceeding or at any hearing before an
arbitrator shall be effective unless evidenced by a writing expressly so providing in connection with an existing controversy signed by the party sought
to be charged therewith." The portion in italics was added in 1955. See N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1955, c. 261.
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To assure that unwilling witnesses will be available, the arbitrator
is empowered to issue subpoenas or, if the witness is not subject to
61
subpoena, to authorize the taking of a deposition for use as evidence.
This does not authorize a deposition for purposes of discovery. Possibly
due to the failure to distinguish these two purposes of depositions, the
committee met with some objection that the use of subpoenas and
depositions was not appropriate to arbitration hearings and should
not be permitted. However, with full discretion and control of their
use in the hands of the arbitrators, it was felt that they would not
be abused and would serve a useful and important purpose in the
occasional case where they are needed. Many states empower
arbitrators to issue subpoenas, 62 and a considerable number authorize
63
the taking of depositions.
If there is but a single arbitrator conducting the hearing and he
dies or for some other reason ceases to act during the course of the
hearing, the hearing, of course, terminates and a new arbitrator must
be appointed and the presentation of the case begun anew. If there
is a board of arbitrators, however, and one of them ceases to act, it
is possible under some circumstances to save the proceedings and
permit the remaining arbitrators to continue. The parties can, of
course, provide for this contingency in their agreement. If they have
not done so, it was felt that some provision should be made in the
uniform act which would permit the hearing to go on in appropriate
cases. Accordingly, the act provides that the remaining arbitrators
64
appointed to act as neutrals may continue with the hearing. If
all are neutrals, those remaining will be able to carry on the hearing
without difficulty. The principal impact of the provision will be in
those cases where tri-partite boards are used consisting of representatives of the parties and of one or more neutral arbitrators. Different
considerations come into play in this situation. While the party representatives are named as arbitrators, their important function is to
bring to the consideration and deliberations of the board the interests
and points of view of the parties represented. All recognize that the
controlling voice and ultimate decision will be that of the neutral
arbitrators. If the neutral members should cease to act, it would be
changing the purposes of the board drastically if the arbitration
were to continue with only the representatives of the parties acting
as the arbitrators. In that event the arbitration hearing must fail,
and this will be the effect of the uniform act. Similarly, if the repre61. UNiFom ARBITRATION ACT § 7.
62. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT. § 1456; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1286 (Deering 1953);
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:4206 (1950); M.cH. CovMp. LAws § 645.6 (1948).
63. CAL. CODE Crv. PRAc. § 1286 (Deering 1953); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:4207
(1950).
64. UNirFomV

ARBITRATION ACT

§

5 (C).
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sentative of one of the parties should cease to act in the course of
the hearing, it would be improper to permit the representative of the
opposing party to continue and participate in the decision. Only the
neutral arbitrators should proceed and render the award.
Awards
The only requirements of the uniform act as to the form of the
award are that it must be in writing and signed by the arbitrators
joining in it. A copy must be delivered to each party personally or
by registered mail or by the method provided in the arbitration agreement. 65 There is no requirement that there be findings of fact or
a supporting opinion. A statement by the arbitrator in the form of an
opinion giving his reasons for the award is desirable. A competent
arbitrator will accompany his award with such an opinion. To insist
on it in the act, however, would invite controversy as to the legal
sufficiency of its form and its compliance in one respect or another
with the requirements of the act. Arbitration legislation generally
does not contain such requirement.
Time limits fixed by the agreement for making the award must be
observed, but, under the act, a party must raise his objection before
delivery of the award to him.66 He cannot wait until he has seen it,
find it not to his satisfaction and then use the lapse of time as an
excuse for avoiding it.
A new provision, largely original with this act, substantially limits
the common law doctrine that once the award has been rendered the
powers of the arbitrators cease and they can do nothing to add to or
substract from or modify or correct it in any way.6 7 The arbitrators
may "modify or correct the award" on several grounds.6 8 One is
for "evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award."
Another is that "the award is imperfect in a matter of form, not
affecting the merits of the controversy." 69 Still a third is "for the purpose of clarifying the award." The authority of the arbitrators to
modify or correct their awards is thus rather carefully circumscribed.
The purpose is to permit the arbitrators to correct a mistake or to
65. Id. § 8(a).
66. Id. § 8(b).

67. See STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS § 220 (1930).
68. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT

§

9.

69. Section 9 incorporates these two grounds by reference to § 13. The latter
section authorizes the court on application to correct the award on these
grounds. A further ground on such application is that the arbitrators have
acted on a matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected
by eliminating this portion of the award if it can be done without affecting the
merits of the balance of the award properly made. This ground was not

included in § 9 since it was felt to be a matter properly for the courts rather
than the arbitrator. The three grounds for correction or modification are
the traditional ones found in arbitration statutes.
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use more definite and precise language in expressing their award
which is otherwise so unclear or incomplete or stated in such inconsistent terms that the performance intended cannot be ascertained. Arbitrators commonly are not lawyers and frequently do not express their
decisions with the clarity and precision needed to render a definite,
complete and understandable award. At the same time, it was not
the intention to permit the arbitrators to re-examine their award and
render a different one. A re-hearing of the case is not to be undertaken.70 Finality of decision is as important in arbitration as it is in
judicial proceedings.
The procedure provided for securing action from the arbitrators
under this provision is quite simple. If there is no application pending
to confirm, vacate or modify the award, an application to the arbitrators may be made by a party within twenty days after the award
is delivered to him. Notice of the application must be served upon
the opposing party who must serve his objections to the proposed
changes in the award within ten days. If the award is before the
court on a motion of the character indicated, the court in its discretion may return the award to the arbitrators to make such changes as
the act permits and under such conditions as the court specifies.71
A valid award may be reduced to judgment by obtaining an order,
by way of motion, confirming the award. Judgment is entered on
this order and is enforced like any other judgment.72 This is the
simple procedure established by legislation since early times. The
uniform act merely represents clarification and further simplication.
There is no time limit on motions to confirm an award. Statutes
authorizing such motions customarily impose a one year limitation.
Since either party may make a motion to confirm, or, if he is objecting to it, to vacate or modify the award, it is difficult to discover
any purpose in a time limitation.
On a motion for an order to confirm, all grounds for vacating or
modifying the award must be asserted by the opposing party. Otherwise, the order of confirmation will bar all further attack on the
award. If a motion to vacate the award is made and is denied, an order
of confirmation automatically follows. Similarly, a motion to modify
or correct the award results in an order of confirmation of the award
either as modified or in its original form.73 The objective of these provisions is to permit the court to settle all questions as to the validity of
the award in a single hearing without the complexity of multiple
motions and counter-motions.
70. A re-hearing may be had only when directed by the court in appropriate
cases on the vacation of an award. See Id. § 12 (c).
71. Id. § 9.
72. Id. §§ 11, 14.
73. Id. §§ 11, 12(d), 13(c).
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Vacatingthe Award
The grounds for vacating an award, traditionally recognized in
statutes going back to the 1829 New York act, are incorporated into
the act. They are found in most state statutes on arbitration. The
New York act in turn merely undertook to codify the existing common law on the subject.7 4 The provisions of the uniform act are
75
relatively short and appear in the following subdivisions:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means.
This refers to the conduct of the opposing party or, possibly, of some
persons other than the arbitrators. No other phrase than "undue
means" was discovered to cover more adequately the miscellaneous
types of conduct which fall short of fraud or corruption but still
give grounds for setting aside the award. The phrase goes back at
least to the English statute of 1689. The subdivision, incorporating
as it does terminology of long standing, will have the benefit of many
years of judicial construction with which little fault has been found.
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a
neutral or corruptionin any of the arbitratorsor misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party.
To the extent that this excludes partiality of an arbitrator appointed
to represent a party as a ground for vacation, this is new. It recognizes
the frequent modem practice, pursuant to agreement, of parties appointing their representatives to a board of arbitrators to represent
and protect their interests. The remaining members, appointed
usually by some other method, are expected to be neutral and to act
with impartiality. Most, if not all, current arbitration statutes fail
to make the distinction.76 In other respects, the subdivision uses familiar language.
74. The revisors stated, "The preceding section is chiefly an enumeration
of the cases in which awards may be vacated, with some extension .... Concealment of material facts, by either party, is mentioned in some cases, 17
J. R. 405, as a ground for vacating an award; but it is conceived that such a
proposition would be too broad, and that the general expressions in the first
subdivision, are preferable."
75. The subdivisions are to § 12(a), as amended in 1956. The uniform act,
as originally approved in 1955, contained three additional grounds for
vacating an award. These were (1) "The arbitrators . . . rendered an
award contrary to public policy," (2) "The award is so grossly erroneous
as to imply bad faith on the part of the arbitrators," and (3) "The award
is so indefinite or incomplete that it cannot be performed."
The first two grounds were considered merely to incorporate existing decisional law. But so much misunderstanding and confusion resulted from
their presence that they were eliminated from the act in 1956. The decisional law, of course, still continues in effect.
The third ground was removed as a result of suggestions to that effect and
in recognition of the fact that it was no longer needed in view of § 9 which
permits the court to refer the award to the arbitrators who rendered it for
the purpose of clarifying it. See notes 68-71 and related text supra.
76. For a general discussion of such boards, see Note, The Use of Tripartite
Boards in Labor, Commercial, and International Arbitration, 68 HAnV. L.
Rnv. 293 (1954).
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(3) The arbitratorsexceeded their powers.
This again recognizes a familiar and necessary ground for vacating
an award. It is discussed below in connection with subdivision (5).
(4) The arbitratorsrefused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence materialto the
controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the
provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of
a party.
This again incorporates commonly recognized grounds for setting
aside an award. Section (5), to which reference is made, spells out
more explicitly than do existing statutes the fundamental requirements of a fair hearing; but in this respect it merely incorporates
principles which have been developed by judicial decision.
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not
adversely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party
did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the
objection.
Subdivisions (3) and (5) are corollaries of each other. If there has
been no arbitration agreement, the arbitrators, of course, have no
power to render an award. But even if there has been such agreement,
the arbitrators may have gone outside of it in their award or beyond
the dispute submitted to them. They would again have exceeded their
powers.
The earlier part of this discussion considered the function of the
court on the related questions raised on an application to compel or
to stay arbitration. It was noted that, under the act, the sole question
for the court to consider at that time was whether there existed an
agreement to arbitrate. To the extent that that question was then settled, it cannot be renewed again after the award has been rendered.
Several other procedural possibilities are presented by the act. The
party demanding arbitration may proceed without seeking an order
to compel it. The opposing party then has several alternatives. He
may move to stay arbitration,7 7 or he may ignore the attempted arbitration and oppose the award rendered on a motion to confirm or by
his own motion to vacate. If he loses on these motions, he will have
suffered a default and lost the opportunity to present his contentions
on the merits of the claim in dispute at the arbitration hearing. Under
subdivision (5), he may also appear at the arbitration proceedings,
state his objections and, if the arbitrator nevertheless proceeds, participate in the proceedings without losing his right to object to any
adverse award rendered. The risk of finding himself in default is
thus avoided.
These alternatives apply to the question of whether there was an

77.

UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 2 (b).
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agreement to arbitrate. In the first of the three categories discussed
earlier,7 8 this was the only question. In the other two, on the other
hand, the primary issue was the permissible scope of the arbitrator's
award under an authorization which extended to the interpretation
of a specific term in the second category and of all terms, express
and implied, in the third. It is the purpose of the uniform act to defer
consideration of the latter question until after the award has been
rendered. It is a new and different question from that arising on
an application to compel arbitration, and it arises in a different
context. The award is now before the court with such explanation
as the arbitrator may have given. It is the duty of the court under
subdivision (3) to measure the award against the powers of the arbitrator conferred by the agreement. The issue then becomes whether
the arbitrator exceeded his authority in rendering the award. Another way of expressing the issue is: Did the arbitrator's award exceed the limits of the arbitration agreement? The question is not
whether the award is one which the court would have made had it
passed on the question. The court is not to substitute its judgment
for that of the arbitrator.
In passing upon the question thus before the court it must be
assumed that, absent an express provision in the contract to the contrary, the parties intended that the arbitrator should not be enabled to
make an irresponsible award at variance with any possible construction of the contract, and that the court and not the arbitrator should
pass on that question. If the parties intend otherwise, it is a simple
matter so to provide in their contract. This being assumed, the question for the court is whether the construction of the contract made
by the arbitrator is a reasonably possible one that can seriously be
made in the context in which the contract was made. Stated affirmatively, if all fair and reasonable minds would agree that the construction of the contract made by the arbitrator was not possible under
a fair interpretation of the contract, then the court would be bound
to vacate or refuse to confirm the award.
It must be recognized that, in fulfilling this judicial function, the
court is called upon to draw a line that is not precise and that where
it is drawn can be influenced by the court's attitude toward the
arbitration process. To deny this function, however, would leave the
parties without a remedy against arbitrary and capricious awards,
which, one must assume, the parties did not intend to make possible
by their contract. If the courts will perform their tasks under the
act with the traditional impartiality expected on any subject, one
may be assured that the purposes of the act will be fully realized.
It should be evident that all the specific details involved in the
78. See p. 693 supra.
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subject of arbitrability cannot be spelled out in the act itself. It is believed that the conclusions drawn in this discussion are required by
the wording and inherent structure of the act. The fundamental aim is
always to give effect to the intention of the parties expressed or
reasonably to be inferred from the agreement. The powers given
to the arbitrator by the arbitration agreement should be recognized
and left unimpaired by any judicial action. On the other hand, the
parties should not be subjected to arbitration on issues never intended
to be left to arbitration. The purpose of the act is not to favor either
party or to give or to neutralize any strategic advantage of one party
over the other. The act is believed to be the best that can be drawn
which will give effect to the contract of arbitration.
One further word should be said about motions to vacate awards. It
applies also to motions to modify or correct an award. This has to do
with the time limits fixed by the act for making such motions. Different considerations apply to these motions than apply to motions to
confirm an award. It is important to the effectiveness of the arbitration process that the award be promptly performed. Hence, attacks
om the award should be promptly made. The customary statutory
limit is ninety days. The uniform act adopts this limit but extends
it also to the assertion of grounds for resisting confirmation of the
award. 79 Hence, if a motion to confirm is made after the ninety days
in which to move to vacate an award have expired, these grounds
cannot be asserted as defenses to the motion to confirm. This results in
no hardship to the opposing party since he, himself, can move to vacate
or modify the award and need not wait until a motion to confirm has
been made. The period of limitation begins with the delivery of a
copy of the award to the party objecting, except that a motion to
vacate "predicated upon corruption, fraud or other undue means ...
shall be made within ninety days after such grounds are known
or should have been known." 80
The foregoing discussion covers the main features of the uniform
arbitration act. The consideration, experience and deliberate judgment of many minds and organizations are reflected in the provisions
of the act. It does not propose a new and radically different approach
to arbitration. For the most part, it has adopted recognized and
tested principles, procedures and practices, some of them having been
in existence in this country for over 150 years-others being of more
recent origin, and molded them into a simple, consistent and understandable act. Its adoption would constitute a decisive improvement
in the law of all states on the subject.
79. Section 11 provides: "Upon application of a party, the Court shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are
urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case
the court shall proceed as provided in Sections 12 and 13." Sections 12 and
13 deal with motions to vacate and to correct or modify an award.
80. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 12 (b).

